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ABSTRACT 
The behavioral theory of “entrepreneurial bricolage” attempts to understand what 
entrepreneurs do when faced with resource constraints. Most research about bricolage, defined 
as “making do by applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and 
opportunities” (Baker & Nelson 2005: 333), has been qualitative and inductive (Garud & 
Karnoe, 2003).  Although this has created a small body of rich descriptions and interesting 
insights, little deductive theory has been developed and the relationship between bricolage and 
firm performance has not been systematically tested.  In particular, prior research has 
suggested bricolage can have both beneficial and harmful effects. Ciborra’s (1996) study of 
Olivetti suggested that bricolage helped Olivetti to adapt, but simultaneously constrained firm 
effectiveness. Baker & Nelson (2005) suggested that bricolage may be harmful at very high 
levels, but more helpful if used judiciously.  Other research suggests that firm innovativeness 
may play an important role in shaping the outcomes of bricolage (Anderson 2008). In this 
paper, we theorize and provide preliminary test of the bricolage-performance relationship and 




  Most entrepreneurs face substantial resource constraints (Shepherd et al., 2000). As 
Aldrich (1999:41) noted ruefully, most firms in creation… “can’t always get what they want, 
and certainly don’t always get what they need.” The modal firm is created with inadequate 
financial, social, temporal and other resource buffers (Wiklund, Baker & Shepherd, 2009; 
Bruderl, Prisendorfer & Ziegler, 1992; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). Bricolage behaviors 
have been identified as a way that some entrepreneurs “make do” by applying combinations of 
the resources at hand to new challenges (Baker & Nelson 2005). Successful bricolage 
behaviors may assist in the development of firms that are better able to manage market 
uncertainties, survive and perhaps even flourish despite resource constraints.  
 
The relationship between bricolage and performance, however, is far from straightforward.  In 
particular, prior research indicates that bricolage can have both beneficial and harmful effects. 
Ciborra’s (1996) study of Olivetti suggested that bricolage helped Olivetti to adapt, but 
simultaneously constrained firm effectiveness. Garud and Karnoe’s (2003) study of the 
emergence of the Danish wind turbine industry showed that firms benefitted in several ways 
from reliance on bricolage rather than “breakthrough” strategies. Hatton’s (1989) studies of 
bricolage by Australian school teachers documented primarily negative outcomes for students. 
Baker & Nelson (2005) suggested that bricolage may be harmful at very high levels, but more 
helpful if used judiciously.  Prior case research in bricolage has predominantly been tested in 
high innovative contexts (e.g. Ali & Bailur, 2007; Ciborra, 2002) with mixed results.  Little is 
known, however, about how innovativeness affects the relationship between bricolage and 
firm performance. 
   
The paper is structured as follows.  We first develop hypothesis concerning the 
bricolage-performance relationship and the contingent effect of innovativeness. We then test 
our hypotheses using data  from the Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial 
Emergence (CAUSEE) project (Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, & Reynolds, 2008), including 
625 nascent (pre-operational) firms and 561 young firms that are operational but less than four 
years old. In our tests, we make use of the new Davidsson-Baker survey measure of bricolage 
behavior. We conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of our findings. 
 
Bricolage and Performance 
 
Entrepreneurs often attempt to overcome resource constraints by engaging in 
resource-seeking behaviors, for example by engaging in sometimes time-consuming processes 
of trying to attract new investments into their firms (Brush, Greene & Hart, 2001).  They may 
also respond to resource constraints by deciding that now is not a good time to pursue a new 
opportunity. Such time consuming delays may be particularly common among nascent 
entrepreneurs, who, because they don’t face the pressures of day-to-day operations may find it 
easier to wait for a “better time” or to control more resources before acting. In bricolage, 
however, “making do” includes a bias for action (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Stark, 1989), 
suggesting that entrepreneurs construct and pursue opportunities without potentially delaying 
attempts to pursue the “right” resources for the challenge. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
 
H1: Bricolage has a positive effect on making progress in the emerging stage of firm creation. 
 
Used as a stop-gap tactic, as a way of getting by temporarily, or as a form of 
inexpensive “forward looking probe” (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), bricolage may be a useful 
way to make do when the only other choice is to wait or do nothing.  However, to the extent 
that solutions built through bricolage tend to be imperfect, and to the extent that customers for 
products and services built through bricolage may tend themselves to be resource constrained 
and relatively undemanding, firms that engage in high levels of bricolage may find it difficult 
to learn to meet the higher quality and performance demands of other less resource 
constrained and demanding customers. As Baker & Nelson (2005) suggest, firms that engage 
non-selectively in bricolage may find it difficult to grow. We extend this logic to argue that to 
the extent that entrepreneurs engage in very high levels of bricolage, they may find it difficult 
to move beyond the “good enough” solutions they offer initially in order to appeal to a larger 
group of customers. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
 
H2: Bricolage has a negative effect on performance once the firm is up-and-running. 
 
  
Bricolage and Innovation 
 
The literature on radical innovation suggests that such innovations may emerge from 
complex combinations of existing resources (Green & Welsh, 2003; Olson, Walker & 
Ruekert, 1995; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990) and require skills and capabilities 
across varied domains (Swink, Sandvig & Mabert, 2003). In the absence of severe resource 
and skills constraints and if firms adopt very high standards for what is “good enough,” 
bricolage behaviors might be one mechanism of radical innovation. Levi-Strauss (1967) and 
others have suggested that bricolage can occasionally produce highly innovative outcomes.  
 
Indeed, because bricolage involves the creation of novel solutions to problems and 
opportunities, the products of bricolage are typically innovations in the sense of an innovation 
as simply the introduction of something new and potentially useful (Gopalakrishnan & 
Damanpour, 1994). The prior literature suggests, however, that innovations produced through 
bricolage (as through most innovation processes) are typically relatively mundane. Even the 
most valuable innovations documented as outcomes of bricolage – such as the wind turbines 
described in Garud and Karnoe (2003) – are often not “breakthroughs” or radical departures, 
but are instead more likely to be largely incremental, or even stopgaps. For example, the 
bricolage that famously saved the lives of three Apollo 13 astronauts was not then adopted as 
an engineered solution to the original problem (Rerup, 2001).   
 
Under more typical conditions, we expect entrepreneurs engaged in bricolage to be 
doing so in the face of substantial resource constraints and to be focused on doing work that is 
“good enough.” Because of this, we expect that attempts to produce radical innovations 
through bricolage under resource constraints may be unlikely to succeed but also likely to 
undermine some of the advantages that may otherwise accrue from entrepreneurs’ selective 
engagement in bricolage. In particular, the attempt to produce radical innovations from 
combinations of the resources at hand, including reliance on self-taught and amateur skills that 
are typical of bricolage, is likely to be a slow going process of trial and error experimentation 
and very gradual accumulation of skills.  The combination of bricolage and the attempt to 
engage in high levels of innovation may therefore result in a slow pace of progress. We 
therefore hypothesize:   
 
H3 Firms (both emerging and those firms that have recently been established) that combine 





Sample and Data  
The main sample 
The data for this research was drawn from the CAUSEE project, a 4-year longitudinal 
study studying firm emergence (Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, & Reynolds, 2008) 
administered through telephone surveys. This study builds on the general empirical approach, 
some contents and lessons learned from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) 
studies in the US (Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds & Curtin, 2008).   
 
In the CAUSEE main study, 28,383 adults (with equal male/female representation) 
from randomly selected households completed a screening interview for eligibility. Like the 
PSED, in order to qualify for inclusion as nascent and young firm in the survey, the 
respondent first had to answer affirmatively to at least one of the following questions: 
1.  Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including any self-
employment or selling any goods or services to others? 
2.  Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a new venture for 
your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work? 
3.  Are you, alone or with others currently the owner of a business you help manage, including 
self-employment or selling any goods or services to others? 
 
The nascent respondents to be eligible also had to confirm that: 
• They were (or intended to be) owners or part owners of the nascent firm. 
• They had undertaken some tangible “start-up behavior” e.g looking for equipment or a 
location organizing a start-up team within the last 12 months.  
If respondents did not answer affirmatively to the above questions they were deemed 
under qualified and did not continue to the full survey.  Further, if nascent confirmed that 
revenues had exceeded expenses for six of the past 12 months they were deemed overqualified 
and screened as a young firm. 
Young firm respondents also had to confirm that: 
• They were owners or part owners of the young firm.  
• They confirmed that they started “trading in the market doing the type of business you are 
currently doing” in 2004 or later. 
 
This process yielded 977 Nascent Firms (3.4%) and 1,011 Young Firms (3.6%). 
These were directed to the full length interview (40-60 minutes) either directly following the 
screener or later by appointment. The full length interviews were completed by 594 NF and 
514 YF cases (representing response rates of 60.8% and 50.8% of eligible cases identified in 
the screener) that are used in our analyses. 
 
As CAUSEE is a 4 year longitudinal survey it enables us to study nascent and firm 
development as it happens. This paper however analyses data from the first of these four 
years, and owing to this, may be considered cross-sectional in nature.  Additional longitudinal 
analysis is expected in future research to evaluate bricolage processes and firm performance 
over time: the first year data was used here for initial tests of bricolage and performance using 





We used a newly developed bricolage instrument and scale to measure bricolage. As 
a new instrument, this required extensive development based on prior grounded research and 
the multidimensional Baker and Nelson (2005) definition.   Its development followed standard 
protocols for scale development (Brown, Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001; DeVellis, 2003).  
One key challenge was the need to design the construct to enable its applicability 
across multiple industries and its use in heterogeneous firms and stages of firm growth.  We 
began by writing a large number of items based on the literature. We then reduced the number 
of items through a variety of processes, including review by other scholars familiar with the 
entrepreneurship and bricolage literatures and by two rounds of pilot testing using a 
questionnaire.  After extensive pretesting and screening 9 items were developed to tap each 
element of the Baker and Nelson’s (2005: 333) definition of the bricolage:  “making do by 
applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities.” In the 
questions we used a response scale where 1 means “never” and 5 means “always” (rather than 
levels of agreement) in order to reflect the behavioral nature of the phenomenon. 
 
In choosing, developing and adapting the new bricolage measure, we considered the 
appropriateness of it being either a reflective measure or formative measure (MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, & Jarvis, 2005).  During this evaluation, we performed ran a Cronbach alpha on 
the bricolage measures. If we were to proceed with reflective modeling, the results revealed 
Cronbach alphas that were above Nunnelly’s  recommended level for consistency (α = .823). 
However, further assessment and consideration of bricolage, discussion with scholars, and the 
use of decision criteria by Mackenzie et al. (2005) indicated that we should treat the measure 
as formative and also resulted in dropping one item as inconsistent with the Baker and Nelson 
(2005) definition. Unlike reflective measures, formative models do not assume that the 
measures are all caused by a single underlying construct:  it assumes that the measures all 
have an impact on (or cause) a single construct. Our final instrument consists of 8 items.  
 
Innovation Measure 
Twelve questions were developed for the innovation measure.  We use a 4 item scale 
which is an elaboration of the scale developed by Dahlqvist (2007) to measure the 
innovativeness of the venture idea. This scale identifies four categories of the venture idea 
newness:  (1) new to the world, (2) new to the market (3) ideas substantially improved and or 
(4) imitative venture ideas. These categories are then defined through four classifications of 
venture ideas; (1) product, (2) method of production, (3) method of promotion and (4) type 
target market/customer.  A continuous variable was computed for these responses and 
summated to develop the overall newness measure used in this research.  This newness 
measure has a theoretical range of 0 to 12.  The actual range in the data is 0 to 12 with a mean 




Early performance assessment in nascent and young firms is difficult (Davidsson 
2008).  For the nascent firms we follow recent nascent entrepreneurship literature that 
measures performance through speed of making progress (Liao and Welsch 2003), calculated 
through the number of gestation activities completed.  The firm outcome variable of prior 12 
month sales is used in this research for newly established young firms.  To reduce skewness in 





We use three categories of control variables. The first category aims to capture the 
overall level of resources – time and money - that have been invested in the firm. Specific 
variables include amount of loans accessed by firm (log), time since the first business activity 
commenced, if the business is being run as a parallel firm i.e. running more than one firm at 
the same time. 
 
            The second group of control variables aims to capture some of the heterogeneity 
concerning the ability the firm has to acquire and develop resources. We include three 
measures of the human capital of the start-up team: education (number of owners with a 
university degree); industry experience (number of years); management experience (number 
of years). 
 
            The third group of variables account for various characteristics. These include: team 
(versus solo dummy); spouse and other type of team (dummy); service (versus product 




Table 1 and 2 reports the result of the regression analysis that models bricolage in 
relationship to firm performance. Hypothesis 1 proposed bricolage has a positive effect on 
performance in the emerging stage of firm creation.  The results indicate that bricolage has a 
statistically significant positive relationship (p< 0.05) to number of relevant gestation 
activities completed in the emerging stage of firm creation.  Hypothesis 2 stated bricolage has 
a negative effect on performance once the firm is up-and-running owing to difficulty in 
meeting quality and performance market demands through potentially imperfect bricolage 
offerings.  The results show bricolage has a significant negative relationship (p<0.05) to sales, 
confirming hypothesis 2. Both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were therefore supported.   
 
Hypothesis 3 proposed firms (both emerging and those firms that have recently been 
established) that combine bricolage behaviors with high innovation will attain lower firm 
performance. Table 3 provides the results for the moderated regression.   Hypothesis 3 was not 
supported in nascent firms: innovativeness did not significantly moderate the bricolage- 
performance relationship.  However, there was a significant negative moderation effect of 
innovativeness on the relationship between bricolage and venture performance (β=-0.011, 
p<0.05) in young firms thereby confirming, in part, Hypothesis 3. Figure 2A illustrates this 
relationship.  Sales have been assigned into 4 equal categories after removing outliers.   Thus 
the effect of bricolage on venture performance (sales) becomes significantly stronger if firms 
make limited use of innovativeness. 
  
Following Venkataraman’s (1989) expanded perspective on fit and co-alignment and 
recent work by Edelman, Brush and Manolova (2005), did preliminary tests of mediating 
effects of innovativeness on the bricolage-performance relationship was tested in nascent 
firms. Mediation tests specify the existence of a significant intervening mechanism (e.g., 
innovativeness) between an antecedent variable (e.g.,bricolage) and the consequent variable 
(e.g., firm performance).  
As such, the mediator variable (e.g., innovativeness) accounts for a proportion of the 
relationship between the predictor and the criterion variables. Figure 1 provides a schematic 




   
 
 
   





        
Fig. 1 The “bricolage→newness →performance” model. (a) The model above is of an indirect model, in that the 
antecedent variable Z (i.e., bricolage) has a direct relationship with the dependent variable Y (i.e., performance) as 
well as an indirect relationship with the dependent variable Y (i.e., performance) through the intervening variable X 




Following recommendations in Baron and Kenny (1986) we ran separate regression 
models to test the relationships between bricolage and newness, newness and firm 
performance and bricolage and performance.  Our preliminary tests found that innovativeness 





In this paper, we developed testable hypotheses from prior descriptive and inductive 
research on the behavior theory of entrepreneurial bricolage, and tested them using a new 
survey measure of bricolage and samples of nascent and young firms. As hypothesized, the 
main effect of bricolage on nascent firm performance was positive. Bricolage led to the 
completion of a higher number of gestation activities completed for nascent firms.  Also as 
hypothesized, bricolage appears to lead to lower reported sales for new firms. Contrary to our 
theory, innovativeness did not have a moderating effect on the impact of bricolage in nascent 
firms; innovativeness did, however, moderate the bricolage-performance relationship in young 
firms.  
In general, our results are supportive of the general theoretical thrust of prior theory 
about bricolage, which we take to suggest that because most new organizations are resource-
constrained in important ways, resourceful behaviors – including bricolage – are likely to be 
play a key role in shaping entrepreneurial outcomes, for better or for worse. Importantly, our 
results support the theme from prior research that entrepreneurial bricolage is neither all good 
nor all bad. To the extent that bricolage in the face of resource constraints is very common, we 
believe that understanding patterns and results of bricolage is a central theoretical and research 
frontier for entrepreneurship. Our unexpected finding that innovativeness may mediate some 
of the effects of bricolage in nascent firms opens up additional important theoretical questions 
about bricolage and innovative behaviors.  
 
Newness/Innovativeness 
Bricolage Venture Performance  
At the most general level, the body of work on bricolage, ours included, suggests that 
within poorly understood bounds, what entrepreneurial firms do with the resources at hand 
may matter at least as much as what those resources are. Stated somewhat more strongly: 
resources are what entrepreneurs make of them. This research complements and also 
challenges the commonplace models of near resource-determinism that have dominated 




We believe that ours are the first systematic empirical tests evaluating bricolage and 
firm performance and the results underline the interconnectedness of innovativeness and 
bricolage on nascent firm performance.  Although our results have important implications for 
the further development of bricolage theory, we stress that these results represent only 
tentative  first steps in providing a greater understanding of bricolage and its influence in 
venture creation and firm performance. As we continue our longitudinal study of bricolage, 
and also begin to examine our sub-sample of “high potential” firms, we will be able to develop 
and test much more nuanced theories of the interplay of bricolage behaviours, processes and 
outcomes.  Future research should also examine a more comprehensive range of outcomes 
including other elements of firm performance and other theoretically relevant contingencies 
such as, for example,  the role of environmental dynamism.  Finally, the new measure of 
bricolage we have introduced provides an important tool for our own and other researchers’ 
continued investigations of entrepreneurial bricolage.  
TABLE 1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
Gestation Activities Complete   DV: Sales (12 months) n= 341 
 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Coeff St error Coeff St error  Coeff St error Coeff St error 
Level of Resources Controls     
 
     
YearsActive   0.025 0.046   0.027   0.046  -0.002 0.017 -0.011 0.016 
Team /Solo (Dummy)  -0.118† 0.818 -0.112†   0.815    0.048 0.202   0.047 0.202 
Spouse Team   0.129* 0.869   0.122*   0.866    0.073 0.208   0.086 0.208 
Log_Loans   0.289*** 0.166   0.292***   0.165  0.238*** 0.030   0.238*** 0.029 
Services/Products Dummy  -0.048 0.689 -0.049   0.687  -0.020 0.160 -0.029 0.160 
Resource Heterogeneity Controls          
Serial Entrepreneur   0.103* 0.691   0.095† 0.690  -0.008 0.131   0.006 0.131 
Single/Parallel Entrep.   0.044 0.745   0.048 0.742    0.022 0.159   0.028 0.158 
Education Level   0.049 0.214   0.047 0.213    0.093 0.048   0.091 0.048 
Industry Exp   0.075 0.019   0.073 0.018  0.281*** 0.004   0.291*** 0.004 
General Manage.Exp   0.000 0.019 -0.008 0.019  -0.185* 0.004 -0.190 0.004 
Industry Controls          
Retail -0.058 0.989 -0.057 0.985  -0.124* 0.264 -0.113 † 0.264 
Hospitality -0.126** 1.479 -0.124** 1.474  -0.017 0.373 -0.021 0.371 
Consumer_Services   0.030 1.007   0.026 1.004  -0.114 † 0.213 -0.104 † 0.213 
Health, Education Social Services   0.028 1.010   0.029 1.006  -0.072 0.222 -0.068 0.222 
Manufacturing -0.100* 1.242 -0.102* 1.237  -0.044 0.298 -0.044 0.297 
Construction -0.023 1.289 -0.026 1.284    0.097  0.188   0.096 0.187 
Agriculture -0.050 1.472 -0.058 1.470  -0.097 † 0.303 -0.094 † 0.302 
Mining -0.036 3.823 -0.030 3.814    0.091 † 0.630   0.094 † 0.627 
Transportation -0.017 2.300 -0.017 2.291    0.013 0.423   0.013 0.421 
Utilities   0.033 4.655   0.024 4.654    0.001 0.487   0.010 0.486 
Communication -0.013 1.407 -0.017 1.402  -0.014 0.323 -0.004 0.323 
Real_Estate -0.053 2.718 -0.060 2.714    0.051 0.702   0.053 0.699 
Finance_Insurance -0.021 2.156 -0.018 2.148  -0.026 0.372 -0.022 0.371 
Direct Effect          
Bricolage     0.097* 0.453    -0.105* 0.093 
           
F  3.374  3.476     3.302  3.350 
Change F       0.009         0.048 
R2  0.134  0.143      0.207    0.217 
      R2    0.009         0.010 
Control entries represent standardized regression coefficients.* P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001, †P0.10 (two-tailed), with directional hypothesis entry (one tailed).   
  
TABLE 2  MODERATION RESULTS 
 
DV: Gestation Activities Complete n= 525  DV: Sales (12 months) n= 341 
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Level of Resources Controls     
 
     
YearsActive   0.025   0.027   0.021   0.020  -0.002 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 
Team /Solo (Dummy)  -0.118† -0.112† -0.121* -0.130*    0.048   0.047   0.050   0.045 
Spouse Team   0.129*   0.122*   0.132*   0.138*    0.073   0.086   0.083   0.086 
Log_Loans   0.289***   0.292***   0.294***   0.294***    0.238***   0.238***   0.238***   0.231*** 
Services/Products Dummy  -0.048 -0.049 -0.033 -0.032  -0.020 -0.029 -0.031 -0.039 
Resource Heterogeneity Controls          
Serial Entrepreneur   0.044   0.048   0.055   0.056    0.022   0.028   0.029   0.027 
Single/Parallel Entrep.   0.103*   0.095†   0.083   0.078  -0.008   0.006   0.008   0.007 
Education Level   0.049   0.047   0.049   0.048    0.093   0.091   0.092   0.084 
Industry Exp   0.075   0.073   0.069   0.073    0.281***   0.291***   0.288***   0.289*** 
General Manage.Exp   0.000 -0.008   0.006   0.008  -0.185* -0.190* -0.189* -0.191* 
Industry Controls          
Retail -0.058 -0.057 -0.048 -0.047  -0.124* -0.113† -0.114† -0.117† 
Hospitality -0.126** -0.124** -0.116* -0.115*  -0.017 -0.021 -0.022 -0.024 
Consumer_Services   0.030   0.026   0.024   0.026  -0.114† -0.104† -0.104† -0.105† 
Health, Education Social Services   0.028   0.029   0.027   0.028  -0.072 -0.068 -0.069 -0.070 
Manufacturing -0.100* -0.102* -0.095* -0.095*  -0.044 -0.044 -0.043 -0.053 
Construction -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.021    0.097†   0.096†   0.095†   0.094† 
Agriculture -0.050 -0.058 -0.050 -0.045  -0.097† -0.094† -0.096† -0.099† 
Mining -0.036 -0.030 -0.024 -0.020    0.091   0.094   0.093   0.095 
Transportation -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 -0.015    0.013   0.013   0.012   0.011 
Utilities   0.033   0.024   0.025   0.024    0.001   0.010   0.010   0.010 
Communication -0.013 -0.017 -0.021 -0.019  -0.014 -0.004 -0.002   0.002 
Real_Estate -0.053 -0.060 -0.054 -0.054    0.051   0.053   0.055   0.054 
Finance_Insurance -0.021 -0.018 -0.013 -0.010  -0.026 -0.022 -0.023 -0.029 
Direct Effect          
Bricolage    0.097*   0.086*   0.083*   -0.105* -0.102* -0.173** 
Innovativeness     0.090*   0.094*     -0.015 -0.008 
Moderating Effect          
Bricolage  x Innovativeness       -0.040       -0.111* 
F   3.374***   3.476***   3.529***   3.426***    3.302***   3.350***   3.208***   3.207*** 
Change F    0.100   0.053   0.103     0.048   0.142   0.001 
R2   0.134   0.143   0.150   0.152    0.207   0.217   0.217   0.225 
      R2    0.009   0.007   0.002     0.010   0.000   0.008 
Control entries represent standardized regression coefficients.* P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001, †P0.10 (two-tailed), with directional hypothesis entries (one tailed).   
















































TABLE 3 MEDIATION RESULTS: NASCENT FIRMS                                                                                                        
    
    
                                   Model 1   Model 2                    Model 3                   Model 4        
   Bric-New New-Perform Bric-Perform Bric/New-Perform 
Level of Resources Controls           
YearsActive     0.074†   0.019   0.027   0.021     
Team /Solo (Dummy)      0.107† -0.128* -0.112† -0.121*     
Spouse Team   -0.115*   0.137*   0.122*   0.132*     
Log_Loans   -0.023   0.293***   0.292***   0.294***     
Services/Products Dummy    -0.180*** -0.029 -0.049 -0.033     
Resource Heterogeneity Controls           
Serial Entrepreneur     0.135†   0.090†   0.095†   0.083     
Single/Parallel Entrep.   -0.077   0.053   0.048   0.055     
Education Level   -0.018   0.048   0.047   0.049     
Industry Exp     0.038   0.072   0.073   0.069     
General Manage.Exp   -0.151*   0.013 -0.008  0.006     
Industry Controls           
Retail   -0.099† -0.047 -0.057 -0.048     
Hospitality   -0.086† -0.127* -0.124* -0.116     
Consumer_Services     0.030   0.027   0.026   0.024     
Health, Education Social Services     0.016   0.027   0.029   0.027     
Manufacturing   -0.078 -0.092 -0.102* -0.095*     
Construction   -0.042 -0.020 -0.026 -0.022     
Agriculture   -0.094† -0.042 -0.058 -0.050     
Mining   -0.070 -0.029 -0.030 -0.024     
Transportation   -0.045 -0.014 -0.017 -0.013     
Utilities   -0.005   0.032   0.024   0.025     
Communication     0.044 -0.018 -0.017 -0.021     
Real_Estate   -0.069 -0.046 -0.060 -0.054     
Finance_Insurance   -0.049 -0.016 -0.018 -0.013     
Direct Effects           
Bricolage     0.115**    0.097*   0.086*     
Innovation/Newness      0.099*    0.090* 
    F     2.376***   3.551*** 3.476***   3.529*** 
    F value Change 
 
   
 
   0.053 
 
 
  R2     0.059   0.105 0.102   0.108 
           R2               0.006         
  Control entries represent standardized regression coefficients.* P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001, †P0.10 (two-tailed), with directional hypothesis entries (one tailed).     
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Appendix 1 CAUSEE Bricolage Measures 
 
 Q1 OK, does the following represent how you never, rarely, sometimes, often, or always go about 
doing things for your start-up? Firstly, … READ STATEMENT 
 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always DK Refused 
We are confident of our ability to find 
workable solutions to new challenges by 
using our existing resources 
1 2 3 4 5 9 8 
We gladly take on a broader range of 
challenges than others with our resources 
would be able to. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 8 
We use any existing resource that seems 
useful to responding to a new problem or 
opportunity 
1 2 3 4 5 9 8 
We deal with new challenges by applying 
a combination of our existing resources 
and other resources inexpensively 
available to us 
1 2 3 4 5 9 8 
When dealing with new problems or 
opportunities we take action by assuming 
that we will find a workable solution 
1 2 3 4 5 9 8 
By combining our existing resources, we 
take on a surprising variety of new 
challenges 
1 2 3 4 5 9 8 
When we face new challenges we put 
together workable solutions from our 
existing resources 
1 2 3 4 5 9 8 
We combine resources to accomplish new 
challenges that the resources weren’t 
originally intended to accomplish 
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